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This Special Issue of critical perspectives on international businesses addresses a question of 
fundamental concern to both scholars of international business and citizens around the world: what has 
changed in the composition and functioning of national economies and the international economic 
system in order to plunge the global economy into a lengthy and, to date, irresolvable crisis? Early 
efforts to paper-over the initial financial crisis (usually judged to have begun in late 2007), by bailing out 
financial institutions and embarking in some tentative, Keynesian-inspired tax cuts and deficit spending 
to underpin demand, may have averted the risk of total collapse, but growing concern about the risk of 
ballooning deficits in government borrowing quickly engendered a return to the deflationary policies 
that had been the main response of government and business elites to the Great Depression of the 
1930s. This policy reversal reflects the stranglehold of neoliberal ideology on economic and political 
thinking almost everywhere: the crisis, no matter how it might have been caused, apparently must be 
resolved through the sacrifices of ordinary citizens.  In Europe, right wing governments which controlled 
all the major states (until Francois Hollande’s victory in France in May 2012) responded to the ‘demands 
of the markets’ by imposing austerity measures both externally (and particularly on the countries on the 
fringes of Europe with weaker economies) and internally, where individual taxpayers and curbs on 
government spending are the primary source of debt repayments.  
 
Across Europe and North America, the standards of living of hundreds of millions of citizens were and 
are subjected to a three-pronged assault: through tax increases, particularly of consumption taxes that 
disproportionately affect those with low and moderate incomes; through declining and more costly 
state services ranging from child-care to health services to higher education, and through reductions in 
state pensions and benefits for the unemployed and disabled. This assault on ordinary people has been 
combined with and facilitated by the scape-goating of those at the margins of the economy: economic 
migrants, Muslims, and ‘welfare cheats’. Meanwhile, apart from a few token scalps among the most 
egregiously irresponsible of financial sector managers, such as British bank RBS’s Fred Goodwin, the writ 
of financial elites remains unchallenged. Here as elsewhere the actions taken by governments were too 
little too late, and reveal very clearly a lack of understanding by political leaders of the processes that 
brought about the near collapse of the international economy.  Certainly, opposition parties including 
the erstwhile political left have also proven incapable of advancing substantially different economic 
policies either in opposition or in power. In addition the capacity for opposition by organised labour (in 
those countries that had significant union movements) has also rapidly declined.  In Britain the potential 
for independent action by trade unions has been weakened by anti-union legislation and the 
effectiveness of their organisations has been dramatically, if not fatally, undercut through the operation 
of neoliberal capitalism in which disarticulated value processes may be relocated to low-wage, low-
regulation, authoritarian production environments, of which China is the predominant example.  
 
Of course, there are numerous analyses of the causes of the global economic crisis that attempt an 
overview and purport to bring the causes to light, both journalistic and more serious (Brummer, 2009; 
Peston, 2008; Stiglitz, 2009). Indeed, there are even some instances in which writers such as Duncan 
(2003) and Roubini (2008) predicted the crisis prior to its onset, and correctly identified it as beginning 
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with the exotic, poorly understood, and inadequately regulated new financial products such as the 
infamous collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  As was predicted and as has been exhaustively 
analysed afterward, these were built upon the sand of insecure income flows from over-extended sub-
prime borrowers drowning in a sea of debt even as their potential for repayment was being further 
undercut by the wholesale exportation of jobs to developing countries. As many now agree, the bursting 
of the US housing bubble had a certain inevitability, but we can be far less sure that the causes and the 
extent of its effects have been fully identified. The type of analysis so far discussed, however accurate it 
might be in pinpointing the specific moment of economic meltdown in 2007/2008, fails to explain the 
conditions of possibility for this particular version of financialized capitalism. Why do we now have such 
a huge over-development of the finance capital sector in Britain and the US, the size of which far 
exceeds any reasonable estimate of the requirements of the commercial and productive sectors of the 
economy in the developed world?  What has produced the recurrent tendency for finance to over-
supply any investment enthusiasm so as to produce speculative bubbles which inevitably collapse and 
produce recurrent debt crises? Much existing work, in the editors’ view, inadequately articulates the 
thoroughgoing changes to the nature of the international capitalist system that have emerged in the 
wake of the victory of the neoliberal thought style (Plehwe, 2009; Harvey, 2005) in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Some solid progress has been and is being made of course, but there is some way to go yet (Duncan, 
2007; Brenner, 2006; Harvey, 2010).  
 
This special issue is devoted to understanding and exploring the different features of the broader system 
of neoliberalized international capitalism that has plunged the world into its current downward 
economic spiral. Commentators often focus on pressures towards financialization, by which is meant the 
increasing, indeed ubiquitous, tendency to focus solely on the current returns on investment when 
evaluating business success.  We do not disagree that there are numerous pressures towards 
financialization, but think it is a symptom as much as a cause of current troubles. One important factor 
here which is seldom discussed is the existence of a large surplus of under-utilised finance capital.  That 
much of this is liquid and highly mobile is a key feature of the present situation.  Jan Fichtner alludes to 
this in the first paper of this special issue by referring to the way the City of London offered new 
financial services which facilitated the handling of surplus capital from around the world.  Britain 
(actually the City of London) , soon to be followed by the USA (or more particularly, Delaware) offered a 
range of new investment services to émigré capital, including access to investments denominated in 
dollars and access to a new range of tax havens substantially beyond the reach of tax authorities 
(Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Shaxson, 2011). Rapidly mobilised surplus capital which is available to feed any 
investment enthusiasm, would not have developed to nearly the same extent, had it not been for the 
huge influxes of capital from various sources in the world attracted by these outlets.  Russia and the 
near-East (with lesser if not less suspect contributions from South American drug cartels and African 
dictatorships) were amongst the sources of funds that flowed to these centres, and which subsequently 
found their  way into the increasingly large and highly liquid pools of hot money available for investment 
(Strange, 1998). In the medium term, of course, the pursuit of more reliable income for such capital 
stimulated the development of new institutions and practices within the centres of finance capitalism in 
Britain and the USA, including the emergence of the so-called shadow banking system.   
 
 In short, in addition to work within the discipline of economics, there is a need for a much more 
adequate consideration of the institutional developments within finance capitalism that have allowed 
new economic processes to enact markets in the destabilising way that they now do.  It is here that this 
special issue begins to make its contribution, by adding to our understanding of the working of key new 
institutions from a social science perspective.     
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New financial institutions within capitalism 
 
A special issue of this journal can be expected to offer some commentary on the impact of financial 
developments on international businesses, and we shall do so in the next section.  However, it is a 
necessary preliminary to discuss some of the institutional developments that have caused the pressures 
from finance on business to take particular forms.   There is an emerging set of new financial institutions 
that not only radically alter the structure of the companies they acquire, but also indirectly  shape the 
behaviour of the executives forming policy for many other companies and lead them to transform the 
structure of their companies as well.   
 
Until recently it might have been thought that what we see today is simply the extension of well-
established trends within Western economies towards short-term investment strategies.  In the UK in 
particular there have long been profit orientated pension funds and business executives increasingly 
remunerated by stock options who have sought short-term profitability in preference to long-term 
growth.  Thus, some pressures towards financialization were in place from as early as the nineteen 
sixties.  While we are not for a moment denying the self-serving motivations of key economic agents, it 
should be recognised that there is a new set of emergent institutional connections through which the 
activities of the cast of relevant actors are mediated.  It seems these new, only semi-institutionalised 
relationships, lacking both self-correcting properties and regulation, have at times shown destabilising 
potential.  In these circumstances it is a relatively complex matter to work out the causal sequences 
arising from such interactions.  Indeed, analysing what happened will show that several distinct groups 
are implicated, and it is clearly wrong to lay the blame at any one door. 
 
Thus the proposal of Sayles and Smith (2006) which suggests that the behaviour of some individuals 
within the executive cadre of major companies can be indicted as being to blame for the problems of 
major US companies and beyond this, to an extent, they are also to blame for our more general 
economic problems as well.  Describing what they take to be the self-serving and destructive actions of 
the “rogue executive”, Sayles and Smith come close to saying that it is a few executive bad apples in the 
corporate barrel that are the problem; and if courses in corporate ethics were made compulsory on 
MBA programmes – presumably still alongside their exposure to advanced accountancy - all might still 
be well.  But although it is clearly necessary to see the complicit actions of business executives as an 
important factor in producing the self-reinforcing change we now see, it is more plausible to see 
executives as opportunistically adapting to their circumstances, than it is to see them as constituting the 
main source of problems by themselves. A similar point is made in this special issue by Sikka and 
Willmott in regard to Charles Perrow’s (2010) argument that “the meltdown was not an accident”. 
Likewise, it is not banking practices, such as the conjoining of retail and speculative banking per se, and 
the excessive risk-taking that senior bankers clearly sanction, that is the root cause of the crisis.  Of 
course, one would have wished that traditional bankers had been more acutely aware of the dangers 
and pitfalls of participation in the emerging finance capital system than they actually were. But the truth 
is that they too have been opportunistically adaptive rather than truly innovative.  Hence, traditional 
banks and bankers are also to some extent victims of recent developments.  That they have not suffered 
the consequences of their lapses is due to government interventions to bail them out, and government 
laxity in not disciplining them subsequently.  The appropriate conclusion to draw is that it is to new 
institutions and practices that we must look for the sources of current instability.   
 
It is therefore interesting but not surprising that elite analysts, who have looked at the influence of 
banking sector executives through interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 2010), have found that the 
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influence of banking executives per se actually declined in the period leading up to the global financial 
crisis. Focusing largely on the United States, Mizruchi argues that a fundamental reorganization of the 
US economy occurred from the early 1980s, with the demise of ‘traditional’ banks which were 
embedded in a relatively diverse capitalist economy and elite networks, and their replacement by 
‘financial innovators’ who emerged in numerous organizational guises. It was these innovators, whose 
distinction it was to think of new ideas about how to use surplus capital and whose actions have been 
most formative in the new financialized capitalism. Of course they thought of themselves as simply 
locating and securing a steady and reliable stream of profit for clients and for themselves.  But what 
distinguishes them is that they developed the range of new institutions, now collectively identified as 
the shadow banking system, and in so doing encouraged the development of an increasingly 
financialized, almost post-market form of organizational capitalism. One of their key initial inventions – 
the private equity (PE) organisation and its associated private equity funds - was not so very different 
from what has been seen before in terms of their profit making strategies and impact on 
financialization.  With the PE fund we have another – and rather more effective – way of taking over, 
stripping out and reconfiguring the assets of public companies.  As such, PE funds are the lineal 
descendants of the predatory conglomerate and the merchant bank which did very similar things to PE 
funds in earlier decades, only less systematically (Morgan, 2009).  
 
PE funds and activist investors, when economic conditions are right for them, actively look for public 
companies they can buy and take private for a limited time.  When they first look at the companies they 
might acquire, they consider them as bundles of assets from which profits can be extracted.  This is, of 
course, a very different point of view from that of the traditional business executive who is seeking 
growth and is willing to invest to secure it.  When actually acquired by PE funds, however, companies 
are rationalised (by which is meant a range of things from simple reorganisation to asset stripping or 
selling off parts or some combination of these).  Usually, in the medium term, such firms are returned to 
public ownership, typically with a much higher debt to asset ratio than before. Such practices are fairly 
obviously aligned with and give support to the process of financialization, because what they do 
encourages firms and their assets to be considered mainly as sources of revenue having a potential 
which can be actively extracted.  However, it is also important to note that the fact that there are agents 
like this, primarily interested in maximising the extraction of surplus from company assets, will have an 
effect on the behaviour of executives of target companies, or of any company that might become a 
target.   Fairly obviously, it is a rational strategy for incumbent managers to take out the surpluses that 
may make them attractive as takeover targets in the first place.  Thus the existence of activist investors 
by itself induces financialization as an outlook and process in the economy at large. This is one of several 
instances where the new arrangements under discussion here exert an influence vastly greater than 
their size alone would indicate. 
 
 The process of financial innovation has no natural limit and has not stopped.  In more recent years 
attention has been drawn to the activities of another type of specialised finance house, hedge funds 
(HFs).  These funds are much more innovative in what they do, and can be identified as the new 
spearhead of the continuing financialization.  What hedge funds attempt is not so much to suspend the 
action of markets (for equities and for corporate control) for a period whilst they extract value, as do PE 
funds.  Instead they actively intervene in markets and, amongst other things, seek to make profits both 
from rising and from falling market movements.  In the first paper in this special issue, Jan Fichtner looks 
at hedge funds in a general way and how they can be considered in the lead in the current stage of the 
transition towards a more thoroughly financialized form of capitalism.  He notes for example that almost 
all hedge funds are legally incorporated in the “secrecy jurisdictions” – tax havens by another name – 
already mentioned.  He also notes that, despite the diversity of their activities, hedge funds tend to 
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promote the financialization of markets by their trading activities. These funds actually account for a 
surprisingly high proportion of stock and commodity trades and so tend to make these markets even 
more highly sensitive. Executives who are already vigilant about their share price seek out and adopt 
only practices that seem likely to yield continuous good performance as judged by the markets.  To do 
otherwise might well make them vulnerable to external control.  Also, as Fichtner argues, there is a 
tendency for hedge funds to act in similar ways to PE funds and in some circumstances to act in concert 
with them.  Thus by actions that are similar to those of private equity funds, they also promote the 
financialization of business corporations.   
 
With hedge funds there is the recurrent suspicion that their actions actually influence the prices of the 
securities in which they are dealing, bringing about price movements that are advantageous to them.  
This is, of course, to subvert what economists have usually taken to be the main purpose of markets, 
which is to fix the price independently of both buyers and sellers. This in itself would not be of much 
note, since there is so much manipulation of prices today, if these organisations were unimportant and 
marginal actors whose activities had very little impact. Unfortunately this is far from true.  Both Jan 
Fichtner and Jamie Morgan, who also contributes a paper to this special issue on hedge funds, suggest 
that although hedge funds are tiny by comparison with the global stock of capital, they wield an 
influence greatly disproportionate to their size. Among other things, Fichtner reports for example that 
hedge funds account for 40% of the trades of major international stock markets, and more significantly 
yet, up to 80% of the trades in high yield derivatives. In a paper that takes us into areas that might seem 
specialized to some readers of this journal and require a grasp of some usually arcane intellectual 
procedures, Jamie Morgan analyses the activity of the type of hedge fund that represents the majority 
of funds in this increasingly concentrated sector. The depth of Morgan’s analysis more than justifies any 
effort required to understand the material.  Such funds operate in the major equity markets, where as 
Morgan also shows, they are responsible for a surprisingly high proportion of all trading. He shows how 
these funds make money from very small margins realised by the use of extremely high volumes of high 
value trades. Morgan candidly suggests that, such is the volume and range of their activity, that they can 
be seen at times to be enacting the whole market, and not just the markets for selected equities.  If 
true, the implications are significant indeed.   
   
Defenders of hedge funds argue that they bring a very high level of responsiveness to markets.  
However, there is a question as to whether this is always desirable.  As we have suggested, they 
encourage a short term calculation of benefit and discourage long-term investment, which are policies 
that inherently disadvantage manufacturing industry.  If it can be added to this that they influence the 
outcome of market processes to their own advantage, then it becomes questionable whether they 
contribute anything of value to economic relations.  However, it is also suggested that hedge fund 
activities are risky for investors – and this is supposedly the key indicator of entrepreneurial activity.  
Surely hedge fund managers should not be denied the opportunity to take risks?  This conveniently 
ignores the fact that hedge funds are designed, as Jamie Morgan’s paper shows here, to take the risk out 
of market trading. In normal trading conditions advantageous trading without risk is what many of them 
do. The riskiness for them enters when markets become unstable and move against predicted trends, 
conditions which many think their own actions often help to bring about.  It is true, for example, that 
the trading in the infamous collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) the defaulting on which precipitated 
the housing finance crisis which later became the general financial crisis, was hugely facilitated, and 
grew into a bubble, by the operation of hedge funds which, at one point, were responsible for 80% of 
the purchases of this class of security. In addition, as Fichtner and Morgan both argue, the resulting 
crisis was made considerably worse by the fact that some hedge fund managers anticipated the bursting 
of the bubble and shorted the CDO market by buying up the ‘insurance’ against default (the credit 
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default swaps or CDSs) very cheaply.  As a result they made huge profits for themselves, but in the 
process greatly deepened the difficulties for those continuing to hold CDOs. In short there is good 
reason to think that hedge funds were key actors in both precipitating the initial financial crisis and in 
intensifying its effects. The riskiness of what they did was as unnecessary as the results were 
unacceptable. 
 
In common with the work of Fichtner and Morgan on hedge funds, all the papers in this special issue 
explore, in their different ways, the decisional behaviour of members of different factions within the 
capitalised elite, and consider how they contribute to more general processes.  Our analysis here shows 
that by different routes their actions conform to a particular model of conduct comprising of the 
elevation of short-term financial return above all other considerations. In this particular form of 
financialized capitalism, financial measurement has become the primary if not the sole yardstick 
whereby success is calculated, both in terms of investment decision-making, and extending to 
measurement of the success of executives, whose worth is increasingly represented not in terms of a 
broader symbolic capital in the Bourdieuian sense, but directly and specifically in terms of extravagant 
awards of incomes and assets.  
 
 
 
Financial measurement, financialization and the transformation of the TNC 
 
Financial measurement represents not only a technique for exercising financial control, but in some 
ways even more importantly, it affects the nature of social relationships within the economy.  Rather 
than viewing an important element of strategy towards its workforce as involving investment in the 
skills and loyalty of their ‘human resources’, as mainstream  management ideas would have it, in 
financialized capitalism immediate revenue streams are paramount, with long term cultivation of assets 
subordinated to relatively short term value realisation. In such contexts, the work even of white collar 
employees is often routinized as far as possible and measured and assessed according to quantitative 
performance targets. Supervision has also become highly standardised, including the rationale that is 
typically offered concerning the effectiveness of the approach. Opportunities for participation within 
such managerial regimes are usually limited. Leo McCann’s paper in this collection reports the findings 
from his study of the attitudes and outlook of employees working in banks and insurance companies in 
Britain. He explains how the work of the employees he interviewed had been subjected to routinization 
by the extensive use of information technology and business systems software, within precisely the kind 
of managerial regime described here.  He finds that much of the work of lower level employees (and 
their supervision) is reduced to highly predictable routines that do not engage the employees’ creativity 
or, for that matter, invoke their loyalty.  The attention of strategic management is not focussed on these 
basic areas of the banking and insurance businesses, but this study and others show that the effects of 
such systems on employee morale and willingness to criticise their managers are noteworthy.  
Traditionally banking and insurance have not been noted for the willingness of their employees to 
dissent from - or even to criticise - the actions of their employers.  However, it is surely likely that critical 
employee responses will become more common as organisations are increasingly subjected to 
financialization. 
 
However, perhaps the most obvious effect of financialization is in the way that the organisation is 
restructured. Large hierarchical structures epitomized by Hymer’s (1970) model of the transnational 
corporation are dismantled both in order to ‘unlock’ the unrealised value potential supposedly 
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contained within such structures, but also to enable the ready valuation (and potentially the 
‘marketization’) of  the different parts of a company’s assets. This in turn leads to the reorganization of 
businesses into a large number of relatively small and autonomous entities held under the strategic 
control of a central holding company.  Whether this holding company is or is not owned or controlled by 
a publicly quoted firm or a private equity fund, does not matter very much: it will still be managed 
primarily through the reaching of financial targets. A financialized management strategy, in which all 
assets are assigned a value and each is allocated an expected return on capital employed, is now 
overwhelmingly standard business practice. In the circumstances it is surprising how few researchers in 
organisational studies have developed realistic accounts of the organisation structures that have 
emerged.   Ackroyd (2002, 2007, 2010) has produced a model from his research into British firms that he 
labels the ‘capital extensive firm’ (CEF).  A similar approach is found in the work of Harland Prechel, 
which describes the new structure being widely adopted by American companies.  Prechel identified 
what he called multi-subsidiary form or multi-layered subsidiary form or MSF (Prechel, 1997; Prechel 
and Boies, 1998; Prechel and Morris, 2010). These models – the CEF and the MSF - have much in 
common, such as the ubiquitous assessment of performance of the various assets of a company and the 
willingness of senior managers to see them as the source of separate revenue streams.  
 
A key point is that the subsidiaries within a MSF/CEF are seen as units that can be traded from one firm 
to another, and also transformed by financial engineering, such as through the securitization of their 
revenue streams, as well as being further dismembered into smaller marketable chunks, or simply 
wound down or sold off if and when they are no longer profitable. This modular form of organization 
has the valuable quality of limiting the risk of a firm as a whole haemorrhaging from the losses arising 
from unexpected events – the collapse of demand in a particular market, a class action for damages or a 
contagious labour conflict. The last of these sometimes occurred in hierarchically organised Fordist 
corporations, where  unions typically represented workers across the entire company and would 
monitor and resist efforts by the firm to introducing differential employment conditions  and to ‘divide 
and rule’. The MSF structure also of course facilitates and promotes off-shoring, engendering minimal 
resistance and conflict because workers in small autonomous firms are unlikely to be able to generate 
wider coalitions to oppose outsourcing effectively. The MSF model also tends to fractionate the 
managerial workforce between a strategic or financialized elite located mainly at the strategic centre, 
and operational and production managers mainly located in the autonomous firms. This permits a small 
corporate elite within the holding company to enrich itself while also being insulated from the divided 
loyalties of the operational managers who need to motivate workers in order to achieve production and 
financial targets and naturally come to share common viewpoints and interests in the future of their 
unit. However, we can also surmise that the MSF/CEF detracts from the concept of corporate loyalty 
that was the hallmark of the ‘Organization Man’ of the 1950s (Whyte, 1956; Sennett, 1998). Thus, just as 
the corporation is dismantled into smaller and smaller marketized units, so the individual employee too, 
faced with the employer’s lack of long term commitment, also views the firm in purely instrumental 
terms, taking opportunities to jump into more advantageous positions and limiting the ability of the firm 
to act as a repository of embedded human capital.  
 
The phenomenon of financialized capitalism that we are describing, therefore, represents a new phase 
of capitalist development with its own characteristics, dynamics, and points of weakness. In this special 
issue we are examining particularly the connections between the policies and practices of transnational 
corporations (TNCs), other large organizations (including financial institutions), and international 
economic crisis. As we have noted, while the causes of the current crisis are often ascribed to specific 
practices of specialized financial institutions and their creation of complex and unmanageable financial 
instruments this explanation focuses on only one overt manifestation of a by now widely extended 
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mode of economic organization. Since well before the 2008 banking crisis, large corporations dispersed 
across the world have been undergoing fundamental transformations with the objective of increasing 
profitability through disarticulation of their structures as we have described. The introduction of much 
more flexible structures in the form of the MSF/ CEF brings with it the possibility of realising profits both 
through production itself including by outsourcing and off-shoring, but increasingly through the use of 
business processes as a platform for value extraction through a burgeoning variety of different vehicles 
including securitization of revenue streams, vesting of value in brands and other intangibles, the 
disembedding of financial and other consulting services and their charge against productive revenue 
streams, etc.  
 
These developments, in which productive processes – whether resulting in the outputs of goods or 
services – are parcelled into subcomponents, not only have a significant impact on the economy, but 
also on the social structure.  Although not immediately apparent, it is nonetheless evident on careful 
analysis that there are changed relationships underway between a reorganised capitalist class and 
subordinate classes nationally and globally. The shift of production from a developed economy (with its 
well-regulated and relatively secure working environments) to developing countries (where there are 
often unregulated sweatshops) graphically illustrates the point. In the developed countries a century of 
generally improving working conditions is under threat, whilst it is difficult to regard the new status of 
unskilled factory workers in developing countries as enviable, or often much of an improvement on their 
traditional situation. Thus, the institution of the value chain has a huge (if partially hidden) impact on 
the balance of forces between elites and the working population both in developed and developing 
countries.  As Smith (2012) notes, outsourcing and financialization are intimately interlinked. Not only 
does a financialized approach to production provide a calculative logic to decisions about business 
process disarticulation and outsourcing, financialization in its broader understanding provides the 
potential for elites to extract the super-normal profits which have been made possible by off-shoring, 
and to realize them largely in tax havens and quasi-havens such as Luxemburg and the Irish Republic. At 
least since the investigations that followed the Enron and WorldCom collapses, it has been widely 
acknowledged that such practices as the manipulation of asset values by shifting them off the balance-
sheet, the avoidance of corporation taxes by realizing profits offshore, and the misrepresentation of 
revenues through creative accounting, are widespread amongst companies internationally (Syal, 2012).  
 
 
The behaviour of executives and the complicity of key professions 
 
We have argued that the changing organization of TNCs and other large corporations is part of a general 
process of capitalist reorganization which both is driven by, and gives further impetus to, the process of 
financialization.  Among the phenomena noted is the multiplication of the transactional nodes within 
business processes (in global capitalism, transnational value chains) at which points a proportion of the 
value created through the chain may be realised.  While some of the highly developed financial 
structures that have been invented are definitively fraudulent, such as the Madoff Ponzi scheme, the 
possibility of corporate malfeasance in ordinary companies has been greatly increased by the particular 
corporate and regulatory law reforms inspired by neoliberalism (Prechel and Morris, 2010).  The 
business corporation today embodies the capacity to construct and govern value chains in which the 
value produced can be channelled in different directions – to be realised as profits in any number of 
possible locations. Indeed, in the US in recent decades there were specific repeals of the tax regulations 
making it easier to devolve tax liabilities to offshore locations.  Given the values implicit in 
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financialization, it should not surprise us that the realisation of profits often occurs in places where 
taxation will be minimal and well beyond the reach of state revenue authorities.   
 
By 2012, in the context of the continuing crisis of state finances, and aided by pressure from activist 
groups such as Occupy Wall Street and UK Uncut, not to mention public interest research by 
organizations and networks such as Tax Justicei, some politicians have begun to explore the nature and 
extent of the leaching of corporate revenues away from the states in which they are generated. 
Hearings held in the UK Parliament in November 2012 revealed a few of the plethora of different 
instruments and mechanisms that major transnational corporations routinely use in order to realise 
value in locations of their choosing. For example, the book and consumer goods internet giant Amazon 
pays taxes on European sales through its Luxemburg subsidiary, a country with a population of 500,000, 
or one-thousandth the population of the European Union as a whole, but with conveniently low 
corporate taxes as well as strong secrecy laws. The pharmaceutical giant Glaxo Smith Klein, similarly, 
used Luxembourg to avoid taxes through a scheme whereby its subsidiary headquartered in that 
country loaned over £6 billion to its UK office, which then repaid the loan with interest of £124 million, 
that was taxed at only 0.5% in comparison with the 28% that would have been payable in the UK (BBC, 
2012). Similarly, in 2011 Vodafone realised profits of £1.6 billion in the small tax haven country of 
Switzerland, despite having minimal operations in that country; profits on which it paid less than 1% in 
corporate tax (Newman, 2012). These examples are not in fact unrepresentative of the practices of large 
firms in general, most paying close to zero (though they often quote employee income tax as their own 
contribution). 
 
It is not at all surprising that the behaviour of corporate executives should support policies of 
financialization, and to be increasingly driven by calculations of short-term value realization. On the 
other hand, the extent of the involvement of key professionals in these processes, and the vigorous 
support they have lent to them, is not widely known.  It is surprising to some, given the historical 
rhetoric of the professions concerning their embodiment of the public interest, how little independence 
the professions have actually shown from their corporate clients.  Indeed there has been a quite 
extraordinary growth of the professions whose skills are required to facilitate corporate change, so that 
in one sense the power of the professionals has seldom been greater. In recent decades very large 
commercial law practices have emerged, typically based in London, for which the provision of legal 
services to MSF/CEF companies with their need for changed structures, loopholes and rationalizations, is 
the main line of work. Every new investment vehicle and every new contract contributes to the revenue 
stream of such firms. Ensuring that there are legal firewalls between business entities, and the legal 
work involved in buying and selling subsidiaries is considerable and earns large fees.    
 
The commercial law ‘factory’, employing very large numbers of lawyers has become a key feature of the 
organisational landscape. Legal firms with hundreds of partners and thousands of employees now not 
only exist but are commonplace in Britain (Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007).  However the scale of these 
companies and their operations pales into insignificance in comparison with the growth of accountancy.  
Accountancy is the business service most required by financialized capitalism. Today there are 
approaching 300,000 practicing accountants in Britain (up by nearly a third since 2001), and the 
profession continues to grow at a phenomenal rate. The UK already has the highest number of 
accountants per capita of any country in the world; and there are more accountants in Britain than in 
the whole of the rest of the EU taken together.  If the numbers of accountants per head can be thought 
of as a measure of the extent of financialization, then Britain is well ahead of the game. 
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The extremely thorough article by Prem Sikka and Hugh Willmott in this special issue looks at the place 
and role of the large accountancy firms in helping to facilitate tax avoidance by individuals and large 
firms.  As we have seen it is a key feature of financialization to extract value and to regard assets as 
sources of value. It should be no very great surprise that major corporations seek to minimise the 
amount of this value that is taken away through the payment of taxes.  There is ample evidence that 
they succeed. Sikka and Willmott suggest that only 210 of the 700 largest British companies paid any 
corporation tax at all, whilst most large companies, if they do pay corporation tax, do so at an effective 
rate well below that paid by the individual taxpayer. There is much evidence also that the largest 
companies are the most adept at avoiding tax.  Certainly, the full extent of this avoidance is actually 
unknown, but there is ample evidence in this paper that the willingness of accountancy firms to devise 
new schemes on a continuous basis is clear. What is perhaps most startling about Sikka and Willmott’s 
account is the extent to which the misbehaviour of firms and their collusion with the major accountancy 
is widely known but not effectively discouraged at the highest levels of the government and the 
professional regulatory bodies. Sikka and Willmott present many examples of what has been called 
elsewhere the ‘revolving door’ (Hacker and Pierson, 2010). In this arrangement, top personnel move 
between positions in the large accountancy firms, the regulatory agencies and the tax authorities. Sikka 
and Willmott suggest that one such example looks like the foxes being been put in charge of the 
hencoop.  This sort of practice is one of many indications that there is actually a high level of agreement 
(or less charitably put, self-interested collusion) over policy amongst economic elites.  
 
While the structures and management strategies of large corporations have undergone rapid and radical 
transformation (Clegg, 2011; Reed, 2011), the causes and consequences of these changes are seldom 
studied systematically. Many organization theorists and economists, for example, continue to think in 
terms of corporate change being related to simple exchanges between the organization and its 
environment, between the corporation and its markets. Academic comment has largely addressed 
narrow and technical issues. Where key issues have been explored, such as the need for corporate 
governance reform (McNulty et al., 2005) and the extent to which strategy formation is driven by 
financial considerations rather than product markets (Froud et al., 2006), these discussions insufficiently 
connected with one another or updated in the context of recent developments.  While such 
developments are beginning, there is a clear need for a much better understanding of the ways in which 
large corporations are actually implicated, and not simply complicit, in the processes of socio-economic 
change that have led to the current global economic crisis. There is a need to explore more deeply the 
nature of the linkages between finance capital, TNC strategies and the policies of governments, as it is 
becoming clear that there is a surprising degree of mutuality inherent in these relationships.  Very little 
attention has been paid to the developments in the organization of international capitalism, conflict and 
class dynamics; however see Sklair (2002), Murphy (2012) and the concluding discussion in this paper.  
 
 
 
Effects on the global financial system 
 
It is important to remember that, as significant as the developments we have considered in this paper 
are, the emergent form of financialized capitalism we have been analysing in this special issue does not 
yet cover the whole world.  It is true that the ideology of neoliberalism is pervasive not only in Britain 
and the USA, but shows every tendency to be spreading throughout Europe and much of the rest of the 
developed world. There are powerful agents of dissemination spreading these ideas and the associated 
patterns of organising. It is surprising to see just how receptive business people in European countries, 
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who do not have the Anglo-Saxon cultural heritage of laisser-faire economics (and from which the more 
virulent form of financialized capitalism we are now seeing has developed), are to the new institutions 
and their associated values.  Here the monopoly which American and British business services groups 
have must not be under-estimated. The framework of commercial law, which now forms the basis of 
almost all trading relationships throughout the world, is of course American, being an outgrowth of the 
British common-law principles. As Sikka and Willmott also document in the course of their contribution, 
the Anglo-Saxon business services groups – the accountants and consultants – who are aggressively 
selling ideas about forms of organising and managing businesses that are uncannily similar to the 
patterns that we have seen in Britain and the USA – are present in almost every country in the world. 
 
It is of course also true that neoliberal doctrine offers powerful incentives to business leaders to 
conform with the patterns of action endemic to it. The value extraction process which is central to 
financialized capitalism rewards top business executives extremely well. This is because the agency 
problem which economists perceived, in which there was supposedly a difference between the interests 
of managers and owners, was solved by making business executives substantial shareholders 
themselves and by tying their remuneration tightly to short-term improvements in their share price.  In 
continental Europe and Scandinavia, of course, there are some very different traditions of company 
governance that limit the tendency of managers to manage in their own interests and those of business 
owners.  In countries like Germany, Sweden and Austria, many small businesses are already privately 
owned with only a small number of shareholders who are usually family or close kin. In these 
circumstances owners typically do not generally see their interests as different from those of the 
management. In many countries outside the UK and US too, where there is significant public ownership 
of shares, not all shares carry the same rights of ownership, so control and ownership are separated.  
Also, of course, with major companies there is the fact that trade unions are represented on company 
boards, so this is also a check on companies being sold or having excessive amounts of value extracted 
from them. Nevertheless, there are relentless pressures for ‘reform’ of these supposedly ‘archaic’ 
relationships, and some business people – particularly the members or aspiring members of the elite of 
international managers – will be susceptible to adopting neoliberal practices. Jan Fichtner suggests here 
that a higher proportion of German companies are becoming vulnerable to takeover by PE funds as the 
number of ‘anchor investors’ reduces. The shift in values towards neoliberalism in formerly corporatist 
economies is often palpable. 
 
The fact that the world markets for large-scale finance capital are located in the main centres of 
financialized capitalism (New York and London) is also of the first importance in disseminating the 
attitudes and values of this system. Every borrower is subject to the terms and conditions under which 
loans are transacted. This is of course a truism, but it is as well to recall that these conditions are 
particular ones which carry with them a strong educative potential. These particular terms and 
conditions suggest to any observers that indebtedness must always be repaid whatever the 
consequences, and that obligations to lenders must always override all other types of obligation.  We 
may contrast this with the repayment conditions that are contrived between German banks and their 
major industrial clients, in which the bank and client firm are interlocked. Time was, of course, when the 
providers of very large loans to countries were vulnerable to debt repudiation. Although this has 
happened in modern times – such as in the Argentinian example in which $9 billion of debt was 
repudiated as recently as 2001 – but the fact is not given a great deal of prominence. In the Eurozone it 
is no longer an option for individual countries to devalue. Also, under the current lending regime the 
conditions attached to indebtedness cannot be readily eased, whilst there is increasing repayment 
discipline built in. Thus the debt which an incautious borrower has taken on, be it a major player such as 
a government or not, can soon become an impossible imposition. The current Southern European 
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economic crisis provides a nice illustration of the processes at work. Although there are significant 
variations to the scenario in this context because of the monetary union within the EU, what we now 
see is a re-run of financial crises that have been enacted in South East Asia and in Latin America in 
recent decades.   
 
The scenario works out like this: as recession deepens some lenders become nervous about the riskiness 
of their loans and a proportion become averse to committing more capital. Another minority, who wish 
to secure their capital, sells out its debt to more aggressive lenders who may also insure (hedge) against 
the further decline in the currency. Such signs lead debt rating agencies – all the significant ones being 
American – to downgrade the standing of current investments, leading to a hike in the price of further 
loans which will now inevitably be needed to service existing debt. Downgrading of course causes yet 
more unease amongst lenders, and in due course further raises the cost of additional borrowing. The 
role of opportunistic lenders who seek profit from the worsening situation is crucial and should not be 
overlooked. Some investors – often led by hedge funds not inappropriately called vulture funds in this 
context – opportunistically insure against further falls in the value of the currency in question, putting 
them in a position to short the currency. Thus they will profit if their debts (often bought cheaply) are 
redeemed at face value, but profit even more from their hedging activities if borrowers default.  Such 
lenders have no interest in a solution being found to the debt crisis, and resist debt restructuring. Such 
actions are abusive, but there is no means of preventing them. The best that can be said is that because 
of weakly developed institutionalisation and the almost complete absence of regulation, the emergent 
system shows potentially disastrous combination of instability and inability to correct itself (Lapavitsas, 
2012). 
 
However, although the Anglo-Saxon pattern of organising finance capital works effectively in many 
situations, it has suffered a setback as a result of our current problems.  In the valuable final paper we 
publish in this Special Issue – by Barbara Weiss and Jay van Wyk – we have a wide-ranging survey of 
developments within finance capital in the world at large following the financial crisis.  Weiss and van 
Wyk argue that gridlock amongst Western lenders following the recent financial crisis has provided 
many opportunities for other lenders to take advantage of the situation and make loans to cash-
strapped companies. Such developments are of course difficult to research in a systematic way. The 
information that researchers need is difficult to find when it is available at all. Despite this, the authors 
here do establish that there are other patterns for the development of finance capital than the Anglo 
Saxon one. In their scheme of analysis Weiss and van Wyk contrast the forms of ‘market structure’ that 
significantly differ from the situation in which there is little regulation – as in the Anglo American 
pattern – from those in which there is significant control of capital markets either by companies and/or 
states. The picture that emerges is that there have been substantial developments since the emergence 
of financialized capitalism in Britain and the USA.  Nowadays, instead of automatically channelling their 
surplus funds through the City of London, countries have set up their own capital funds – sovereign 
wealth funds – which are within their direct control.  Some states – of which China is the most important 
example – increasingly use their control of finance capital, whether it is channelled through their banks 
or their major companies, as an instrument of foreign policy.  As Weiss and van Wyk argue, the extent of 
these developments has been given a firm push by the locking up and dysfunction of the Western 
system of finance capital. If governments are not moved by some of the effects of the system of 
financialized capital we have been considering here, we think they should take note of this. There are 
large sections of the world that have either been ignored or abused by Western capitalism, that are now 
being supplied with finance with different strings attached.  
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We have suggested that the epicentres of growth of financialized capitalism are Britain and the USA. In 
these countries, as we have seen, there are special reasons that initiated the characteristic pattern of 
institutions and practices and then extended its development. In consequence, this type of capitalism 
has developed much further and more rapidly than elsewhere.  The jury is still out as to how far the 
effects of financialization will reach, and whether as is argued here, much of the rest of the EU and 
NAFTA is at risk of being drawn into it. But we should be aware that, for better or worse, the system we 
find emerging not only has obvious systemic weaknesses, it is in competition with financial systems 
promoted by other and often even less politically democratic regimes than our own.   
 
 
Changes in class relations  
 
There is an important dimension to the changes we have been reviewing here, which is often not 
accessed in academic discussions, or only rather inadequately so. This concerns the social class changes 
that are also a basic feature of the economic transformation we have been examining. The rise of 
financialized capitalism is underpinned by and indicative of changes in the class composition of the 
societies in which this form of capitalism first appeared and which have increasingly become subjected 
to it. In Britain it is clear that there has been the rise of a segment of the ruling class that derives its 
wealth from finance as opposed to industrial or commercial capital, and the practices and the 
ideological priorities of this group have been increasingly influential. This group has not only introduced 
the new institutions and practices we have briefly examined in earlier sections of this introduction, but it 
has also influenced government policies through the dissemination of its political ideology as well.  It is 
the interests of this group that are most clearly enshrined in neoliberal political ideology. Amongst other 
things, these highly distinctive ideas have prioritised the rewards for the owners of capital and 
enshrined the pre-eminence attributed to profit-making. Given the weakness of the industrial economy 
in these respects, neoliberalism facilitated the sweeping away of the remaining corporatist policies and 
institutions associated with industrial capitalism. The restructuring of the economy by the development 
of transnational value chains has permitted the outsourcing of large parts of production to low wage, 
poorly regulated, and frequently repressive sites within developing countries to the detriment of the 
working class at home.  
 
Only by standing back from the consideration of the corporation and the disarticulated business 
processes in which it is engaged, can the overall character of the emerging socio-economic system of 
financialized capitalism be clearly seen.  The simultaneous reduction in labour costs achieved by 
outsourcing and the increasing share of value realised from remote locations suggests a growing 
internationalisation in the outlook of the owning class. But the most obvious effect of the adoption of 
financialization, which reveals its class based character, is in the growing levels of inequality noted in 
Britain and the US where the phenomenon of financialized capitalism is at its most developed, and 
where too we see the unmistakable signs of overt class frictions and conflict. In terms of growing 
inequality, the US Congressional Budget Office has reported that the share of overall income earned by 
the top 1% more than doubled from 9.1% of the total in 1980 to 18.8% in 2006; a period coinciding with 
the rise of neoliberalism and the establishment of financialized capitalism (CBO, 2009). In fact, the 
slogan of the 1% greatly overstates the size of the dominant elite in the United States.  Paul Krugman, 
the Nobel Prize winning economist, noted that, “[B]etween 1979 and 2005 the inflation-adjusted, after-
tax income of Americans in the middle of the income distribution rose 21 percent. The equivalent 
number for the richest 0.1 percent rose 400 percent” (Krugman, 2011). He also points out that, at the 
same time, several rounds of large tax cuts benefitting the wealthy were enacted, effectively magnifying 
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the effect of the growing income inequality in benefitting the rich. Thus, wealth distribution also skewed 
even more heavily towards the top echelon; by 2010 the top one percent of the population in the US 
owned 40% of all wealth, an increase from one third in a twenty-five year period (Wolff, 2010).  
 
A similar pattern can be observed in the United Kingdom. The Gini coefficient of inequality, which 
compares the proportion of incomes captured by those at the top versus those at the bottom of the 
income distribution, increased from 26 to 40 in the decade to 2009 (Monbiot, 2011), bringing the 
country closer to US levels of inequality than those in Continental Europe (where financialized capitalism 
has developed more slowly and encountered greater social resistance). The income share of the top 1% 
doubled to 14.3% in the thirty five years to 2005 (OECD, 2011). At the same time, the share of lower 
income employees declined precipitously; the bottom half of employees earned only 10% of GDP in 
2010, compared to 16% in 1977 (Sikka, 2012). In the same period, the share including bonuses of the top 
10% of earners rose from 10% to 16%. In other words, income share lost by the poorest half of the 
workforce had found its way into the pockets of the top 10%. Most tellingly, this widening income gap 
between the top and bottom coincided with progressively less social mobility in the United Kingdom, 
with the OECD – hardly an organization noted for radical criticism – remarking that the country’s tax and 
social benefit systems have become less effective in redistributing income. A manifestation of the 
leaching out of state tax revenues in financialized capitalism, described in the previous section, is found 
in the decline in UK tax revenues between 1981-2 and 2011-12 from 45.5% to 37.8% of GDP (Sikka, 
2012), a time period once again coinciding with the rise to predominance of financialized capitalism 
driven by neoliberal ideology, and a consequent diminution of both the state’s capacity and its ambition 
to combat rising inequality (R Murphy, 2011). 
 
Financialization, therefore, represents not merely a reorganization of the processes of capitalist 
production, but a particular class strategy of international elites to take advantage of the new conditions 
of international political economy that were opened through the intellectual and policy triumph of 
neoliberal thinking in the 1970s and 1980s. Without necessarily subscribing to theories of an organic 
international capitalist class (Sklair, 2002; Robinson, 2004), it is clear that the transnational organization 
of capitalism that is inherent in the financialized model depends on the existence both of a stable 
governance regime that provides assurance that production chains and networks can be reorganized 
without hindrance across boundaries, and profits realised avoiding most taxation. This in turn relies 
upon capitalist elites and supportive governments in the most important countries (both in the 
developed and developing world) sharing a common understanding of mutual interests and of the most 
appropriate governance regimes to facilitate financialized capitalism. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The deeply rooted nature of financialization within broader social and political life is reflected in the 
peculiarly conflicted character of political leadership in the neoliberal era: the Republican candidate for 
the US presidency in 2012 (who despite being defeated, secured 48% of the popular vote) wrapped 
himself in the flag in the traditional display of nationalist cant considered apropos for the ‘leader of the 
free world’, while simultaneously championing his qualifications as a successful businessman. The 
contradiction is that Mitt Romney’s business acumen was largely acquired through his co-founding and 
leadership for over a decade of Bain Capital, a private equity / investment company that focused on 
highly leveraged buy-outs, outsourcing of business processes to China and other low-wage economies, 
and the innovative use of tax havens such as the Cayman Islands (where Bain Capital holds over 100 
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investment funds) to avoid paying tax in the United States and other jurisdictions where Bain Capital 
assets actually operate (Shaxson, 2011, Fifield and McGregor, 2012; Corn, 2012). Only in an era where 
neoliberalization has extended far beyond the domestic economy and become instantiated in the value 
systems of large swathes of the population as well as amongst the elite, could someone be considered 
electable in a major Western country who has so assiduously built enormous wealth through the 
dismemberment of productive organizations, the disposal of the national workforce in favour of low 
wage foreign workers operating under repressive regimes (Selden and Jieh-Min, 2011; Ngai and Chan, 
2012), and the realisation of profits outside the purview of national tax authorities. Nor is this 
increasingly denationalized elite restricted to the United States; senior members of Britain’s 
governments – of all political stripes – as well as its senior bureaucrats, have long been closely linked 
with financialized capital, including private equity vehicles, outsourcing consultancies, and the  
channelling of wealth through tax havens (Times, 2008; Channel 4, 2012; Syal and Williams, 2012). 
 
The demonstrable growth in inequality naturally coincides with the re-emergence, albeit often in new 
and non-traditional forms, of class conflict. Whereas in earlier periods, trade unions formed the front 
line of the battle for an equitable distribution of income and wealth, the reorganization of production 
chains across national boundaries and beyond the capacity of nationally-bound unions to challenge 
resulted in a long period during which inequality grew with relatively little resistance. This was 
facilitated by another feature of financialization, as discussed earlier, which was the unbridled growth of 
credit, particularly as extended to precisely those segments of developed countries’ populations that 
were hardest hit by the outsourcing of production to developing countries. The credit explosion 
provided at the same time an expanded income stream from securities facilitating the further 
financialization of the economy, and a false sense of well-being among lower income citizens due to 
their new ability to purchase homes despite insecure and often declining income. By the late 2000s, the 
entire Anglo-American financial sector had effectively become a Ponzi scheme that was inevitably 
headed for a crash. Once the implications of the crash on the lives of ordinary people became clear, and 
especially after the initial Keynesian response was replaced by a more ‘robust’ neoliberal stance, the 
emergence of resistance was inevitable. This resistance is perhaps best epitomized by the spontaneous 
development in 2011 of the ‘We are the 99%” movement. The 99% movement targeted a financial elite 
that appeared both to have caused the current financial crisis, and yet to have maintained an inordinate 
share of income and wealth, as well as a disproportionate and self-interested voice in state and 
transnational policy making processes geared to resolving the crisis caused by financialization. Even as 
the initial impetus of the 99% movement subsided, conflicts in the peripheral areas of Europe deepened 
and became more entrenched as popular resistance towards bond holders’ and their government 
backers mounted.   
 
It would be a mistake, despite the signs of a Polanyian ‘dual movement’ of capitalist reorganization and 
working class resistance, to view the various anti-finance capitalism movements as representing an 
immediate and real threat to the continuing domination of finance capitalism. To begin with, the 
movements are generally lacking a coherent alternative to the existing order, reflected for example in 
the inability of Greece’s popular left-wing Syriza movement to articulate specifically what steps it would 
take,  if it assumed power, to respond to the austerity measures being imposed by the European Union 
(Albo, 2013). Similarly, once the initial euphoria of the 99% movement subsided, the lack of a corollary 
social base to that which the trade unions had enjoyed in an earlier period meant that the energy of the 
movement could quickly dissipate and effectively be lost as activists dropped out of the movement in 
search of incomes. More fundamentally, the problem of confronting globalized capitalism remains:  
citizens are physically located in particular places, while capital is able to move freely across borders, 
effectively sidestepping nodes of resistance. In an international environment where the standard of 
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living of Western workers remains far above that of those to whom work is being outsourced in 
developing countries, the immediate possibilities of transnational resistance appear limited in the 
extreme (J Murphy, 2011; Wad, 2007).  
 
Instability in emerging economies, already seen in 2013 in Turkey and Brazil, and potentially particularly 
explosive if the phenomenon spreads to China, is a more likely threat to the continued expansion of 
transnational value chains. The effective tripling of the global workforce since 1980, through the 
integration of China, India, and other Asian country workforces into the international production system 
(Smith, 2012a) was necessary in order to drive down production costs and discipline the Western 
workforce. However the relatively small proportion of the benefits of this newly transnationalized 
production that accrue to developing country workers has created a highly volatile situation in China 
and elsewhere, in which the limited payoff from sweatshop employment confronts the offshore 
workforce with the reality that participation in the consumption economy will remain a chimera for 
most. The exponential rise in incidents of explosive resistance over recent years is likely to continue 
(Ngai and Huilin, 2010), with increasingly more serious ramifications for overall system stability, that 
cannot indefinitely be suffocated by a combination of repression and concession. The willingness of 
developing country governments to offer up their workers for financialized capitalism will thus be 
constrained by the need to satisfy increasingly impatient populations while also ensuring the elite 
continues to enjoy its own benefits for managing the global integration of national workforces.  It can be 
speculated that the smooth continuation of the mutually beneficial developed country – developing 
country elite alliance is somewhat unlikely, raising the risk of disruptions to the free international flows 
of capital and goods that are necessary for the continuation of international financialized production.  In 
particular, the eminently contestable nature of governance of the value chain (and hence the location 
and distribution of value extraction), especially within financialized capitalism where so much of the 
value is captured by intangibles, will surely become a major issue as developing country elites and 
governments seek to assert their interests (Starosta, 2010).  
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